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Digest: McCarther v. Pacific Telesis Group
Rebecca J. Kipper
Opinion by Moreno, J., with George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter,
Chin, Corrigan, JJ., and O’Rourke, J.1
Issue
Are sick leave policies that provide for an uncapped number
of compensated days off governed by Labor Code section 233?
Facts
Kimberly McCarther and Juan Huerta each took absences
from work to care for sick family members.2 Although McCarther
and Huerta did not work for the same employer,3 as members of
the Communications Workers of America labor union, they were
subject to the same sickness absence policy under section 5.01F
of the union’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA).4 Under
this policy, employees are paid for any day in which they are
absent from work due to their own illness or injury for up to five
consecutive days in any seven-day long period.5 There is no limit
on the number of days that an employee may be absent from
work,6 but there is an attendance management policy in the CBA
which sets forth a progressive scheme of discipline, up to
termination, for excessive absences.7 Although absences for a
personal illness or injury are compensated under section 5.01F,
they still constitute an absence which is subject to discipline
under the attendance management policy.8 In addition to paid
sick leave, the CBA provides for six paid personal days which are
not considered absences for the purposes of the attendance
1 Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
2 McCarther v. Pac. Telesis Grp., 225 P.3d 538 (Cal. 2010). McCarther was absent
for seven consecutive days. Id. at 540. Huerta was absent for five consecutive days. Id. at
541.
3 McCarther worked for SBC Services, Inc., and Huerta worked for Pacific Bell
Telephone Company. Id. at 539.
4 Id. at 540.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
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management policy.9
Neither McCarther nor Huerta was
compensated for the absences to care for sick family members,10
and neither was disciplined in connection with the absences.11
McCarther and Huerta brought a representative action
against their respective employers12 for failure to provide
employees with paid leave to care for relatives as required by
Labor Code section 233,13 also called the “kin care” statute.14
Before class certification was complete, plaintiffs and defendants
filed motions for summary judgment and summary adjudication
for a determination of whether the defendants’ sickness absence
policy under section 5.01F of the CBA qualifies as sick leave as
defined in section 233.15
The trial court held that since
employees do not earn or accrue any leave under section 5.01F,
the defendants’ absence policy did not constitute sick leave under
section 233, and it granted the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment.16 The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s
decision and held that the absence policy did constitute sick leave
within the meaning of the kin care statute.17 The defendants
appealed to the California Supreme Court.18
Analysis
The court examined the language of the statute in order to
determine whether it governs defendants’ sick leave policy.19
First, section 233 requires that if an employer provides sick
leave, then it must also provide kin care leave in “an amount not
less than the sick leave that would be accrued during six months
at the employee’s then current rate of entitlement.”20 It is clear
Id.
Huerta requested and was granted one paid personal day in connection with his
family care absences per the personal day off policy. Id. at 541.
11 Id. at 540–41.
12 The employers involved were SBC Services, Inc., Pacific Telesis Group, Advanced
Solutions, Inc., Southwestern Bell Video Services, Inc., Pacific Bell Information Services,
and SBC Telecom, Inc. Id. at 539.
13 Id. Labor Code section 233 requires that an
employer who provides sick leave for employees shall permit an employee to
use in any calendar year the employee’s accrued and available sick leave
entitlement, in the amount not less than the sick leave that would be accrued
during six months at the employee’s then current rate of entitlement, to attend
to an illness of a child, parent, spouse, or domestic.
Id. at 541 (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 233 (West 2010)).
14 Id. at 541.
15 Id. Section 233 defines sick leave as “accrued increments of compensated leave.”
Id. (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 233).
16 Id. at 541.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 542 (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 233).
9
10
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from this language that in order to apply the statute to an
employer’s sick leave policy, it is first necessary to calculate the
amount of sick leave that an employee would accrue in a sixmonth period.21 Under the defendants’ policy, there is no cap to
the number of days that employees can be absent for sick leave
as long as they operate within the attendance management
policy.22 Therefore, it is not possible to determine how many
days of sick leave that an employee would accrue in six months in
order to apply section 233.23
Plaintiffs proposed, and the court dismissed, two ways in
which kin care leave could be calculated under defendants’
absence policy in order to make section 233 applicable.24 First, as
to plaintiffs’ suggestion that the rate of entitlement during any
six-month period is the five-day increment of leave that an
employee earns,25 the court explained that under the defendants’
plan, the only period for which the entitlement can really be
calculated is for a seven-day period because the amount of
compensated time is not “banked.”26 Therefore, since the rate of
entitlement cannot be calculated for a six-month period, the
legislature did not intend section 233 to apply to sick leave
policies like the defendants’.27
Further, the Legislature’s
adoption of section 234, which prohibits employers from counting,
for disciplinary purposes, any sick leave taken under section 233,
supports this conclusion.28 Presently, due to the lack of a limit on
the number of absences, the defendants’ absence control policy is
the only limit on its sick leave policy.29 Thus, if section 233
applied to the defendants’ absence control policy, then
section 234 would also apply and would prohibit the defendants’
only limit to the number of sick days taken for kin care.30 Since,
an employee would be limited in the amount of personal sick
leave he could take (by the attendance management policy), but
not in the amount of kin care sick leave he could take, this would
have the effect of allowing the employee to take more kin care
sick leave than personal sick leave.31 This result would be
Id. at 542.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 542–43.
27 Id. at 543.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
For example, if defendants cannot utilize their attendance management
policy, then an employee would be allowed to take unlimited, compensated five day
absences for kin care as long as he returned to work for a partial day each week. Id.
31 Id.
21
22
23
24
25
26
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directly contrary to the plain language of the statute, which
contemplates that employees will only be permitted to use half of
their annually accrued sick leave for kin care.32
The court found the plaintiffs’ alternative proposal for
calculating the kin care entitlement—that it should be based on
the amount of sick leave actually used—equally unpersuasive
because it presumed, wrongly, that section 233 is not concerned
with certainty and precision.33 The court noted the flaw in this
method, which is that it would be impossible for an employer to
determine the exact amount of kin care leave to which its
employees are entitled.34 The statute’s clear intent is to provide
employers with precise guidelines as to an employee’s kin care
entitlement.35 The plaintiffs’ interpretation of the statute ignores
this intention and therefore was rejected.36
Finally, plaintiffs’ argument as to calculating kin care
entitlement failed because it was “self-defeating.”37 The clear
intent of the legislature, illustrated by the plain language of the
statute, is to give employers notice of how many kin care days
they were required to provide.38 Plaintiffs’ argument, which
proposed two different ways of calculating kin care entitlement,
resulted in two different calculations under the same policy,
which clearly violates the intent of the statute.39 Thus, the court
rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments and concluded that an
employer must have clear guidelines as to an employee’s kin care
requirements and, therefore, that the amount of kin care leave to
which an employee is entitled must be ascertainable from the
employer’s absence policy in order for section 233 to apply.40
In addition to being limited to absence policies in which the
amount of kin care leave is ascertainable, the court noted that
the reach of section 233 is also limited by the definition of sick
leave in the statute.41 The statute defines sick leave as “accrued
increments of compensated leave,” and further states that
employees may only utilize “accrued and available” sick leave for

32 Id. Section 233 plainly states that an employee may take, in a one-year period,
kin care leave equal to the amount of regular leave days accrued in a six-month period.
Id. at 541 (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 233).
33 Id. at 543.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 543–44.
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kin care.42 In order to determine if the defendants’ sickness
absence policy is sick leave as defined in the statute, the court
analyzed the meaning of the word “accrued.”43 The most usual
definition of accrued is to accumulate over a period of time.44
Yet, even under the plaintiffs’ proposed, non-temporal definition
of accrual as leave that is earned but not yet paid,45 it is still
clear that section 233 does not apply because the parties had
previously stipulated that employees under the defendants’ sick
leave policy do not accumulate or bank any specific number of
paid sick days in a year.46
The court dismissed plaintiffs’ contention that the definition
of the word accrued changes depending on how it is used in the
statute.47 The plaintiffs claimed that the word accrued, when
used in the statute to explain that employees must be allowed to
use “accrued and available sick leave” for kin care, means to
“come into existence,”48 and thus, since the defendants’ policy
provides employees with an enforceable right to use sick leave,
the employees have accrued leave. Therefore, according to the
plaintiffs’ argument, the policy is controlled by section 233.49
This reasoning is flawed for two reasons. First, although Black’s
Law Dictionary does define the word accrue as a right coming
into existence, it only does so in the framework of a cause of
action.50 Since section 233 does not concern causes of action, a
more usual and ordinary definition, such as to accumulate,
applies here.51 Second, if plaintiffs’ definition is accepted, then
the word accrued would have the same definition as the word
available.52 The rules of statutory interpretation mandate that a
construction which makes a word a surplusage must be
avoided.53 Therefore, since accepting plaintiffs’ definition would
make the word available unnecessary, it is clear that the
Legislature intended the two words to have different meanings,
and plaintiffs’ proposed definition was rejected.54

Id. at 544 (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 233(a), (b)(4)).
Id. at 544.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
50 Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 22 (8th ed. 2005)).
51 Id. at 544.
52 Available is defined as “present and ready for use.” Id. at 545 (quoting AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 123 (4th ed. 2000)).
53 Id. (citing Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n., 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387
(1987)).
54 Id. at 545.
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
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The second, and final, use of the word accrued appears in the
statute’s definition of the term sick leave as “accrued increments
of compensated leave.”55 The court rejected the Court of Appeal’s
contention that the words “accrued” and “increments” mean the
same thing in this definition because it would cause the word
increments to be surplusage, which is clearly not what the
legislature intended.56 In addition, the court stated again that
the usual and commonsense definition of the word accrued means
to accumulate,57 and once again concluded that section 233
applies only to sick leave policies that provide for an accumulated
number of days off; not to policies like the defendants’ that
provide for an uncapped and unbanked number of days off.58
Finally, the court turned to an analysis of the legislative
intent of the statute.59 Legislative intent must be ascertained by
examining both the language of the statute and its legislative
history.60 The fact that section 233 includes a definition of the
term sick leave shows that the legislature was aware that the
term could have more than one meaning.61 If the legislature had
meant for every type of sick leave policy to be covered by the
statute, they would have stated that expressly; since they did
not, it is clear that they meant to exclude some types of sick leave
plans.62 Even though the plain language of the statute clearly
shows a legislative intent to limit the types of policies to which it
applies, the court went a step further by examining the statute’s
legislative history.63 The statutory history is filled with examples
of intent to limit the reach of the statute.64 The court noted that
the phrase “sick leave, as defined” is found throughout the
historical documents, which illustrates that the legislature
understood the definition in the statute to be limiting.65 In
addition, the court found it conclusive that, before the statute
could pass the legislature, the definition of the term sick leave
was changed by amendment from a very inclusive definition that
would have likely included defendants’ policy to the current
definition, which is much more restrictive.66 The court concluded

55
56
57
58
59
60

Id. (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 233(b)(4)).
Id. at 545.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 542 (citing Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n., 43 Cal. 3d 1379, 1387

61
62
63
64
65
66

Id. at 545.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 546.
Id.

(1987)).
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that the legislative intent was to limit the types of absence
policies to which section 233 applied to only those defined in the
statute, i.e., those which provide for an accumulated or banked
system of sick leave.67
Holding
The court reversed the Court of Appeal.68 The court held
that the kin care statute does not apply to sick leave policies
which provide for an uncapped number of compensated days off
because it is impossible to determine the amount of sick leave
that an employee may take under such a policy.69 Therefore,
since there is no limit to the number of days that employees may
be absent from work under the defendants’ sick leave policy, the
kin care statute does not apply, and the defendants are not
required to provide employees with paid absences to care for sick
family members.70
Legal Significance
The court’s holding prevents an employee who is subject to a
paid sick leave policy that provides for an uncapped number of
days off from demanding paid kin care leave under section 233.
However, the court’s decision does not preclude such an employer
from complying with section 233.
On the other hand, an
employer that provides sick leave in the form of an accrual-based
system is required to comply with the requirements of the kin
care statute by providing its employees with paid kin care leave.

67
68
69
70

Id.
Id.
Id. at 543.
Id. at 546.

